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INTRODUCTION
Life on the high seas was not easy for seamen, as this life involved
cruel treatment by masters and a lack of regulation.1 Historically, this class
of maritime workers has been entitled to special judicial protections as the
wards of admiralty.2 Although admiralty courts understandably became a
shield for these workers in turbulent times, a seaman today is no longer
thrown into the same rough waters. Congress has legislated extensively in
the area of maritime tort remedies,3 and employers have responded by
making worker safety a major goal of the maritime shipping industry.4
Consequently, courts should no longer use the rocky waters of the past as
justification to expand claims and remedies when the seas are much
calmer.
One remedy that courts have recently expanded is the availability of
punitive damages to seamen.5 In Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend,6
the United States Supreme Court held that seamen were entitled under
general maritime law to recover punitive damages for their employer’s
intentional failure to pay maintenance and cure—a remedy that includes
medical and living expenses arising out of an accident or illness that occurs
during the seaman’s employment.7 The Court based its decision on the
Copyright 2015, by PHILLIP M. SMITH.
1. See infra Part II.B.1.
2. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 417 (2009).
3. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
4. See generally Stanley A. Millan & Patrick J. Veters, Deck the Hulls with
OSHA, 2 LOY. MAR. L.J. 44 (2003) (discussing the dual regulatory authority of the
United States Coast Guard and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
in the field of maritime worker safety).
5. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 424.
6. 557 U.S. 404.
7. Id. at 424.
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alleged historic availability of such damages and the absence of statutory
preemption.8 It is unclear whether the reasoning of this decision extends
to allow recovery of punitive damages for unseaworthiness—the general
maritime-law duty imposed on a shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel.9
Recently, in McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C.,10 the United States Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that unseaworthiness punitive
damages are unavailable.11 The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s petition
for a writ of certiorari, ensuring that the availability of unseaworthiness
punitive damages and the scope of the Court’s reasoning in Townsend will
remain unsettled outside the Fifth Circuit.12 As district courts in other circuits
have allowed punitive recovery for unseaworthiness, the Court should resolve
this important issue and establish uniformity throughout the country.13
Otherwise, the scattered availability of unseaworthiness punitive damages
will have a detrimental impact on maritime shipping, an industry that is
responsible for transporting the majority of the world’s goods.14
In McBride, the Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that unseaworthiness
punitive damages should not be available to seamen for three reasons.15
First, the reasoning of Townsend does not extend to unseaworthiness,
because no significant history of unseaworthiness punitive damages exists,
and the failure to pay maintenance and cure is a fundamentally different
legal claim.16 Second, the unavailability of punitive damages under the
Jones Act17—a statutory negligence action for seamen—should be
extended to unseaworthiness because the two claims typically involve a

8. Id. at 424–25.
9. Compare Snyder v. L & M Botruc Rental, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 728, 737
(E.D. La. 2013) (holding that unseaworthiness punitive damages are unavailable
under general maritime law), with Wagner v. Kona Blue Water Farms, LLC, 2010
A.M.C. 2469, 2483 (D. Haw. 2010) (holding that unseaworthiness punitive
damages are available under general maritime law).
10. 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
11. Id. at 384 (holding that Miles controlled their decision).
12. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
13. Compare Snyder, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 737, with Wagner, 2010 A.M.C. at
2483.
14. See McBride, 768 F.3d at 401 (Clement, J., concurring) (“Given the
sizeable percentages of the world’s goods that travel on ships, and the fact that the
prices of the remainder of the world’s goods are indirectly influenced by the prices
of the goods that do travel on ships (e.g., oil prices ultimately affect the price of a
vast range of items), the decision in this case needs to have only the minutest
impact on shipping prices to have a significant aggregate cost for consumers. In
light of the potentially sizable impact, this court should not venture too far and
too fast in these largely uncharted waters without a clear signal from Congress.”).
15. Id. at 384.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012).

622

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

single legal wrong.18 Third, the court in McBride properly determined that
courts should not distinguish the availability of unseaworthiness punitive
damages between injured seamen and wrongful-death representatives.19 To
preserve uniformity in admiralty and protect the interests of maritime
commerce, the Supreme Court should address this issue and hold that
unseaworthiness punitive damages are unavailable.20
Part I of this Note provides background on the powers of Congress and
the federal courts to create admiralty law and explicates the specific
remedies that these branches have made available to seamen. Part II explains
the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in McBride and chronicles the uncertain
history of maritime punitive damages. Finally, Part III analyzes whether
unseaworthiness punitive damages should be available and concludes that
the Fifth Circuit reached the correct result in McBride.
I. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS AND THE COURTS IN CALMING
THE STORMY SEAS
The legislative and judicial branches have a concurrent role in shaping
admiralty law.21 Determining the remedies available to an injured seaman
is an important issue in admiralty law that the Constitution requires these
institutions to resolve.22 Those remedies exist under both statutes23 and
judge-made common law;24 however, whether the responsibility to expand
these claims belongs to Congress or the courts remains unclear.
A. The Scope of Admiralty Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has interpreted the United States Constitution as
granting the federal government the power to determine the substantive law
in admiralty.25 In the United States, two primary sources of maritime law
exist: general maritime common law, which the federal courts developed
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part III.C.
20. See infra Part III.D.
21. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (“[I]n the absence of
some controlling statute the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts
constitutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction.”).
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See, e.g., The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012).
24. See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
25. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 215 (“Considering our former opinions, it must now
be accepted as settled doctrine that in consequence of these provisions Congress
has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail
throughout the country.”).
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under the authority of the Admiralty Clause of the Constitution,26 and
statutory maritime law that Congress enacted.27 In the absence of a
controlling statute by Congress, judge-made common law governs
admiralty.28 The interplay and seemingly concurrent authority in this area
causes conflicts to arise between Congress and the federal courts.29
Although maritime tort law in early America consisted mostly of
judge-made common law,30 federal statutes now dominate this subset of
admiralty.31 Recently, the Court has advocated for judicial restraint in
areas where Congress has passed legislation, speaking specifically to the
balance between Congressional statutes and judge-made maritime
common law.32 The Court acknowledged that Congress “retains superior
authority in these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to
overstep the well-considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation.”33
Critics claim that this reasoning was a complete departure from the
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . .”).
27. 46 U.S.C. § 30104; see also Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 360–61 (1959); but see William H. Theis, United States Admiralty Law
as an Enclave of Federal Common Law, 23 TUL. MAR. L.J. 73, 75 (1998) (“The
Constitution contemplates that, before Congress enacted a single statute, there
was an already existing body of maritime law. The historical understanding was
that federal courts had the constitutional authority to declare admiralty law only
to the extent that they dealt with issues recognized by other maritime countries as
calling for a specialized body of law necessary to satisfy the needs of maritime
commerce. Although admiralty law was not frozen as of 1789, it is erroneous to
posit that admiralty law is whatever law the courts (or the legislature) create to
deal with cases that fall within admiralty jurisdiction, a jurisdiction whose limits
are largely defined by the courts themselves.”).
28. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 215.
29. Theis, supra note 27, at 74.
30. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 207 (1994) (“[T]he Judiciary
has traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law
maritime.” (quoting United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409
(1975))); see also Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“Congress
has largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules
of admiralty law.”); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310,
323 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is appropriate to recall that the
preponderant body of maritime law comes from this Court and not from
Congress.”); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“No area of federal law is judge-made at its source
to such an extent as is the law of admiralty.”).
31. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990).
32. Id. at 27 (“In this era, an admiralty court should look primarily to these
legislative enactments for policy guidance. We may supplement these statutory
remedies where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of such policies
consistent with our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep strictly within
the limits imposed by Congress.”).
33. Id.
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traditional roles of Congress and the courts.34 However, Congress is
arguably in a better position to prescribe the substantive law in admiralty
as an elected, law-making body. Unlike the judiciary, the legislative
branch is able to investigate critical policy concerns, such as the impact of
remedial expansions on the maritime shipping industry.35
The Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the constitutional
grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal government as providing a
body of law “operating uniformly in[] the whole country.”36 The goal of
uniformity demands consistency in the law governing persons and
companies engaged in the interstate and international maritime industry.37
For example, in the context of state workers’ compensation schemes, the
Court held that Congress could not authorize states to provide the
compensation remedy for maritime workers under the Constitution
because inconsistent remedies in different state systems would destroy the
uniformity that the Constitution required.38 The Court has also applied this
uniformity principle to interactions between judge-made common law and
maritime statutes by providing that if a certain type of recovery is
unavailable under a statutory claim, the courts should be reluctant to allow
such relief on a similar claim brought under general maritime law.39 The
uniformity principle gives guidance as to what remedies and recoveries
are available to seamen, particularly in the area of punitive damages.
B. The Remedies Available to the Wards of Admiralty
Only maritime workers who qualify as seamen are entitled to sue their
employers for maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and negligence
under the Jones Act.40 The Court has fashioned a two-part test to determine
whether a maritime worker satisfies the requirements of seaman status: (1)
34. See David W. Robertson, Our High Court of Admiralty and Its Sometimes
Peculiar Relationship with Congress, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 491, 514 (2011)
(arguing that courts should not be hesitant to expand maritime tort remedies
simply because federal statutes exist).
35. Theis, supra note 27, at 74 (recognizing that Congress is the preeminent
creator of admiralty law).
36. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
37. Robert Force, The Curse of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.: The Mischief of
Seeking “Uniformity” and “Legislative Intent” in Maritime Personal Injury
Cases, 55 LA. L. REV. 745, 765 (1995) (arguing that uniformity should not be
applied in the personal injury context because that area has “always been
characterized by substantial differences”).
38. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920).
39. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990) (“[A]n admiralty
court should look primarily to these legislative enactments for policy guidance.”);
see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
40. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995).
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the employee’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to
the accomplishment of its mission; and (2) the employee must have a
connection to a vessel, or to an identifiable fleet of vessels under common
ownership or control, that is substantial in both duration and nature.41 If
that test is satisfied, the worker is a seaman who can recover personalinjury damages under maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and Jones
Act negligence.
1. Maintenance and Cure
In 1903, the Supreme Court explicated the remedies available to
seamen under the general maritime common law in The Osceola.42 First,
the Court recognized “[t]hat the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a
seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of
his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage
is continued.”43 The remedy is commonly referred to as the employer’s
obligation to pay maintenance and cure.44 Following The Osceola, the
Court has explained that maintenance and cure includes wages until the
end of the voyage, a sum for food and lodging, and medical expenses until
the seaman reaches maximum medical cure for his condition.45 An
employer’s failure to pay maintenance and cure constitutes a second injury
occurring after the illness, incident, or negligent act that caused the initial

41. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991) (“The key
to seaman status is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation . . .
we believe the requirement that an employee’s duties must ‘contribut[e] to the
function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission’ captures well an
important requirement of seaman status.” (quoting Offshore Co. v. Robinson, 266
F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959))); Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (“[A] seaman must
have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such
vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.”); Harbor
Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 558, 560 (1997) (The Court added the
requirement that the identifiable group of vessels must be subject to “common
ownership or control.”).
42. 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
43. Id.
44. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §
6:12, at 305–10 (2d ed. 1975).
45. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001); see also
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, at 305–10 (describing “maintenance and cure”
as including medical expenses, a living allowance, and unearned wages). A
seaman is entitled to maintenance and cure until he or she reaches “maximum
cure”—the point at which medical science can no longer improve the seaman’s
condition. See Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 524 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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injury to the seaman.46 The Court has acknowledged this distinction by
emphasizing that “a seaman’s action for [the wrongful failure to pay]
maintenance and cure is ‘independent’ and ‘cumulative’ from other claims
such as negligence and that the maintenance and cure right is ‘in no sense
inconsistent with, or an alternative of, the right to recover compensatory
damages [under the Jones Act].’”47 Due to the unique risks seamen face in
the course of their employment, courts have liberally construed the
maintenance and cure remedy in favor of the seaman to allow recovery.48
In this spirit, the Court recently concluded in Townsend that an employer’s
willful failure to pay maintenance and cure could result in punitive
damages.49
2. Unseaworthiness
The second general maritime law remedy recognized by The Osceola
was “[t]hat the vessel and her owner are . . . liable to an indemnity for
injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the
ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances
appurtenant to the ship.”50 Fundamentally, this means that a shipowner has
a duty to provide a seaworthy vessel that is reasonably fit for its intended
use.51 Although the origins of unseaworthiness give the impression that
46. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, at 342 (“It is unquestioned law that
both the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness remedies are additional to
maintenance and cure: the seaman may have maintenance and cure and also one
of the other two.”).
47. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 (2009) (quoting Pac.
S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1928)) (alteration in the original); see
also David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 73, 147 (1997) [hereinafter Punitive Damages] (“[T]he action
for damages for withholding maintenance and cure is ‘completely separate and
independent’ from the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims.” (quoting E.
DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 95.24 (1987))).
48. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 318 U.S. 724, 727–28 (1943) (“From
the earliest times maritime nations have recognized that unique hazards,
emphasized by unusual tenure and control, attend the work of seamen.”); see
generally Koistinen v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 83 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y.C. City Ct.
1948) (awarding maintenance and cure to a seaman who injured himself when he
was forced to jump from a brothel window after a dispute arose over fees).
49. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 424.
50. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
51. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (“What has
been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish an accident-free
ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel and
appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is not perfection,
but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather every conceivable storm or
withstand every imaginable peril of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for
her intended service.”).
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the claim is rooted in a negligence action, which would impose a duty on
the shipowner to exercise due diligence,52 the Supreme Court has accepted
that The Osceola “enunciated a concept of absolute liability for
unseaworthiness unrelated to principles of negligence law.”53 In Mahnich v.
Southern Steamship Co.,54 the Court interpreted The Osceola to hold that the
duty to provide a seaworthy ship does not depend on the negligence of
shipowners or their agents.55 The Court went further in Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki,56 stating that unseaworthiness “is essentially a species of liability
without fault . . . . neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual
in character.”57 The Supreme Court has argued, however, that the doctrine
has developed to closely resemble a negligence action.58 Rarely will a
situation arise where the facts creating an unseaworthy condition would not
also give rise to a claim for negligence.59 In further support of this notion, the
Court has stated that “[w]e are able to find no rational basis . . . for
distinguishing negligence from seaworthiness.”60 The Supreme Court,
however, has not yet decided whether punitive damages are available to
seamen when an unseaworthy condition causes injury.61

52. See id. at 544 (“The decisions of [the late nineteenth century] for the most
part treated maritime injury cases on the same footing as cases involving the duty
of a shoreside employer to exercise ordinary care to provide his employees with
a reasonably safe place to work.”).
53. Id. at 547.
54. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
55. Id. at 100.
56. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
57. Id. at 94.
58. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971) (“[O]ur
cases have held that the scope of unseaworthiness is by no means so limited. A
vessel’s condition of unseaworthiness might arise from any number of
circumstances. Her gear might be defective, her appurtenances in disrepair, her
crew unfit. The number of men assigned to perform a shipboard task might be
insufficient. The method of loading her cargo, or the manner of its stowage, might
be improper. For any of these reasons, or others, a vessel might not be reasonably
fit for her intended service.”).
59. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 418 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[I]t will be rare that the circumstances of an injury
will constitute negligence but not unseaworthiness.”); Note, The Doctrine of
Unseaworthiness in the Lower Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 819, 820 (1963)
(“An unseaworthy condition can be found in almost anything, no matter how
trivial, that causes injury.”); but see Magnussen v. Yak, Inc., 73 F.3d 245, 248
(9th Cir. 1996) (where a jury found the vessel seaworthy, but still found the
employer liable for negligence under the Jones Act).
60. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 815
(2001).
61. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir.
2014) (en banc).
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3. Negligence: The Jones Act
Although The Osceola prohibited seamen from suing their employers
for negligence, the Jones Act legislatively overruled this bar to recovery
by creating a negligence action for seamen against their employers.62 The
Jones Act broadened the remedies available to seamen through its
incorporation by reference of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
(“FELA”).63 In overruling The Osceola’s negligence prohibition, Congress
demonstrated that maritime statutes preempt judge-made common law.64
Under the Jones Act, a seaman can recover for injuries sustained in the
course and scope of his employment due to the negligence of the owner,
master, or fellow crew members.65 Because of their extensive overlap, Jones
Act negligence and unseaworthiness are often referred to as the “Siamese
twins” of admiralty.66 Seamen cannot recover punitive damages under the
Jones Act because they are not recoverable under FELA.67 As a result, the
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that the logic
that blocks punitive damages under the Jones Act extends to
unseaworthiness.68

62. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991). The third
and fourth points of The Osceola overruled by the Jones Act were:
3. That all the members of the crew, except, perhaps, the master, are, as
between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover
for injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the
crew beyond the expense of his maintenance and cure.
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the
negligence of the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to
maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence
or accident.
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
63. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012) (“A seaman injured in the course of employment
or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may
elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the
employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or
death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.”).
64. See Wilander, 498 U.S. at 341 (explaining that Congress twice tried to
overrule The Osceola to create a negligence action for seamen).
65. Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1489 (5th Cir.
1992).
66. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, § 6:38, at 383.
67. See infra Part III.B.1; but see John W. deGravelles, Supreme Court
Charts Course for Maritime Punitive Damages, 22 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 123, 144
(2009) (“Punitive damages are pecuniary and therefore there is no legitimate
reason why punitive damages should be withheld in a Jones Act case.”).
68. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2014)
(en banc).
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II. MCBRIDE AND MARITIME PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR SEAMEN
In McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a seaman could not recover punitive damages for
unseaworthiness.69 The decision correctly recognized that courts should be
reluctant to allow seamen to recover unseaworthiness punitive damages
when a similar statutory claim, the Jones Act, prohibits punitive relief.70
A. The Case: McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C.
The Fifth Circuit was the first federal circuit court to consider whether
punitive damages are available under the general maritime claim of
unseaworthiness after the Supreme Court’s decision in Townsend.71 In
holding that unseaworthiness punitive damages were not available, the
Fifth Circuit addressed important questions regarding the reasoning and
scope of the Supreme Court’s previous decisions on the subject.72 This
issue is still far from settled, however, as some district courts have reached
different conclusions.73 Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
McBride,74 the Court will likely resolve this important issue eventually,
hopefully using the persuasive reasoning of the Fifth Circuit as guidance.
1. Facts and Procedural History
The case arose from an accident that occurred on Estis Rig 23, a barge
that supported a truck-mounted drilling rig operating in Bayou Sorrell, a
navigable waterway in Louisiana.75 The crew, all employed by Estis Well
Service, attempted to straighten the monkey board on the derrick, which
had twisted the previous night.76 The derrick pipe shifted during this task,
which caused the rig and derrick to topple over.77 One crew member, Skye

69. Id.
70. Id. at 391.
71. Id. at 384.
72. Id. at 384–85.
73. See, e.g., Wagner v. Kona Blue Water Farms, LLC, 2010 A.M.C. 2469,
2483 (D. Haw. 2010) (holding that unseaworthiness punitive damages are
available under general maritime law).
74. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
75. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 872 F. Supp. 2d 511, 512 (W.D. La.
2012).
76. Id. A monkey board is a catwalk that extends from a derrick, which is the
tower-like framework over an oil well. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C.,
731 F.3d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc granted, 743 F.3d 458 (5th Cir.
2014).
77. McBride, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
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Sonnier, died after being pinned between the derrick and the mud tank.78
Three other members of the crew also claimed injuries resulting from the
incident.79
Haleigh McBride, individually and on behalf of her and Sonnier’s minor
child, filed suit against Estis, stating causes of action for unseaworthiness
under general maritime law and negligence under the Jones Act.80 Notably,
McBride sought “punitive and/or exemplary” damages in addition to
compensatory damages for the claims filed.81 The other crew members
alleged the same theories and requested similar punitive relief.82 After the
case was consolidated into a single action, Magistrate Judge Hanna in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted
Estis’s motion to dismiss the claims for punitive damages under the Jones
Act and unseaworthiness, reasoning that a prior Supreme Court decision
limited both Jones Act and unseaworthiness recovery to pecuniary losses.83
McBride appealed to the Fifth Circuit where a three-judge panel reversed
the judgment of the district court, applying the reasoning of Townsend to
hold that unseaworthiness punitive damages were available.84 After hearing
the case en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed the panel and held that seamen
could not recover punitive damages under unseaworthiness or the Jones
Act.85
2. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision
The Fifth Circuit based its opinion on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,86 which the court found controlling.87 The
court recognized that Miles held “the Jones Act limits a seaman’s recovery
to pecuniary losses where liability is predicated on the Jones Act or
unseaworthiness.”88 The court further explained that this pecuniary loss
limitation should apply to both wrongful death and personal injury.89 The
78. McBride, 731 F.3d at 507.
79. Id. (noting that the injured crew members were Saul Touchet, Brian Suire,
and Joshua Bourque).
80. McBride, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 512–13.
81. Id. at 512.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 512, 522. Although magistrates do not typically render judgments
for the district court, the parties here consented to that procedure. Id. at 512.
84. McBride, 731 F.3d at 506–07, 518.
85. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2014).
86. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
87. McBride, 768 F.3d at 384. Judge Davis wrote the opinion of the court and
only Judge Southwick joined. Seven other judges concurred in the judgment:
Jolly, Jones, Smith, Clement, Owen, Elrod, and Haynes. Id. at 382–83.
88. Id. at 384.
89. Id. at 388.

2015]

NOTE

631

Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Townsend “reaffirmed that Miles is still
good law.”90 The court explained that Townsend drew a distinction between
maintenance and cure and the other remedies available to seamen so that the
reasoning in Townsend should not extend to unseaworthiness, which was
the cause of action directly addressed in Miles.91 Framing the Miles
limitation to be “compensation” for pecuniary losses, the court reasoned that
punitive damages were non-pecuniary because such damages do not
compensate the seaman.92 The court concluded that, because punitive
recovery is not available under the Jones Act, punitive damages are likewise
unavailable in unseaworthiness claims.93
Judge Clement, joined by four other judges, wrote a meticulous
concurring opinion to explain the historical background that directed the
court’s result.94 The concurrence first recognized that Supreme Court
precedent does not require punitive damages in this case because Townsend
concerned maintenance and cure, not unseaworthiness.95 Second, Judge
Clement reasoned that no primary authority supports unseaworthiness
punitive damages because courts should not use jurisprudence concerning
maintenance and cure as a guide.96 Third, the concurrence undertook an
analysis of the historical availability of unseaworthiness punitive damages
and discovered that not many cases, if any, have actually awarded those
damages.97 Judge Clement cited language in Pacific Steamship Co. v.
Peterson98 to support the proposition that unseaworthiness plaintiffs have
historically been entitled to only compensatory damages.99 Finally, the
concurrence cautioned that admiralty courts should be hesitant to sign off
“on an aggressive expansion of punitive damages in the unseaworthiness
context” because of the sizable impact that this expansion would have on
the shipping industry.100
Two other judges filed a separate concurrence to argue that the Miles
reasoning, prohibiting the recovery of non-pecuniary unseaworthiness
90. Id. at 389.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 390.
93. Id. at 391.
94. Id. (Clement, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 392.
96. Id. at 395 (“Rather, the primary authority supporting punitive damages in
unseaworthiness cases appears to be a collective judicial ‘oh, hell, why not’
principle that holds that because punitive damages are available in many other
types of actions they should also be available in unseaworthiness cases.”).
97. Id. at 397.
98. 278 U.S. 130 (1928).
99. McBride, 768 F.3d at 398.
100. Id. at 401 (“In light of the potentially sizable impact, this court should not
venture too far and too fast in these largely uncharted waters without a clear signal
from Congress.”).
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damages, is limited to only wrongful-death claims; accordingly, they
argued that punitive damages should be made available to seamen only in
cases of personal injury and not in wrongful-death or survival actions.101
Because this concurrence emphasized that the expansion of a remedy is a
subject best left to Congress, however, it joined in the result.102
The primary dissenting opinion, which Judge Higginson authored and
five others joined, essentially restated the decision Judge Higginson penned
for the three-judge panel.103 This dissent interpreted Townsend as
establishing that “the common-law tradition of punitive damages extends to
maritime claims,” and “that in the face of historical dispute, the default rule
of punitive damages applies.”104 Additionally, two judges wrote a second
dissent to amplify the primary dissent’s “observation that extending the
Miles pecuniary damages limitation to the injured crew members in this case
compounds the error in the majority opinion.”105 Using similar reasoning to
the second concurrence, this dissent argued that Miles should be applied
only to wrongful-death causes of action.106 The judges also argued that the
majority incorrectly assumed that compensatory and pecuniary damages are
equivalent.107 The split in reasoning among the Fifth Circuit judges
illustrates the confusion that currently exists regarding punitive damages for
seamen, likely resulting from the unclear history of such damage awards in
maritime cases.
B. The Long, Stormy Voyage of Maritime Punitive Damages
In McBride, the Fifth Circuit attempted to bring some clarity to the
issue of maritime punitive damages for seamen; however, this task proved
difficult, as the history and development of these damages has been
tumultuous. In contrast to compensatory damages that are designed to
compensate plaintiffs for actual losses, punitive damages serve to punish
the defendant and deter the undesirable conduct in the future.108 The

101. Id. (Haynes, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 404.
103. See id. (Higginson, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 413 n.15.
105. Id. at 419 (Graves, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 424 (“For example, pain and suffering is not a financial loss and is
difficult to reduce to a monetary amount; thus it is not a pecuniary damage
according to the definition incorporated into FELA. Yet there can be no question
that injured seamen can seek recovery for their own pain and suffering under the
Jones Act and the general maritime law.” (citation omitted)).
108. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008).
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history of punitive damages in maritime law is unclear.109 Their
availability is often murky and actual recovery is rare, especially by
seamen.110 By analogy, some Supreme Court decisions regarding loss of
society damages are instructive as to whether a certain type of recovery
can be judicially expanded when it is unavailable under a similar statutory
claim.111 Although the Court has asserted the default availability of
punitive damages under general maritime law, the question remains
whether these damages are available to seamen for unseaworthiness.112
1. The Availability of Punitive Damages to Seamen Before the Jones
Act
Although the fact that plaintiffs can generally seek punitive damages
under the common law is fairly settled,113 whether that general rule extends
to the wards of admiralty has been the subject of much debate.114 In Day
v. Woodworth,115 the Supreme Court acknowledged that it is a “wellestablished principle of the common law, that in actions of trespass and all
actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary,
punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant.”116 Although the Court
has recognized the general availability of punitive damages in the
maritime tort context,117 few cases, if any, have awarded those damages to
seamen.118 In The Amicable Nancy,119 the Court acknowledged the
potential availability of punitive damages; however, the Court did not
award those damages because the case was against the shipowner and not
the pirates who plundered the ship.120 The Court’s likely motivation for
109. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 431 (2009) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“In sum, the search for maintenance and cure cases in which punitive
damages were awarded yields strikingly slim results. The cases found are
insufficient in number, clarity, and prominence to justify departure from the Miles
uniformity principle.”).
110. See infra Part II.B.1.
111. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990).
112. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 476.
113. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 409.
114. See Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 86.
115. 54 U.S. 363 (1851).
116. Id. at 371.
117. See Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 108 (1893)
(“[C]ourts of admiralty . . . proceed, in cases of tort, upon the same principles as
courts of common law, in allowing exemplary damages . . . .”).
118. See infra Part II.B.
119. 16 U.S. 546 (1818).
120. Id. at 558–59 (explaining that “if this were a suit against the original
wrong-doers, it might be proper to . . . visit upon them in the shape of exemplary
damages, the proper punishment which belongs to such lawless misconduct. . . .
Under such circumstances, we are of opinion that they are bound to repair all the
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mentioning punitive damages was simply to condemn piracy, which is less
prevalent in the modern context of maritime personal injury.121
Although the Supreme Court recently asserted in Townsend that
punitive damages have historically been available to seamen, upon a closer
look at the cases the Court cited for that proposition, whether such
damages were actually recovered is unclear.122 In The City of Carlisle,123
a 16-year-old seaman suffered a fractured skull while working on a ship,
was forced to continue work for 6 or 7 weeks after the injury, and was
denied medical care at the completion of the voyage.124 Based on the
failure to provide maintenance and cure, the Carlisle court recognized that
“the ship may be held to consequential damages,” resulting from the
“gross neglect and cruel maltreatment” that aggravated the injury.125 The
court awarded the boy $1,000, but whether these damages contained a
punitive element is far from clear, especially because the court’s damage
calculations appeared to be focused purely on compensating the degree
that the injury was aggravated from neglect rather than punishing the
defendant.126 In The Margharita,127 a case some claim lends the most
support to the argument that punitive damages were available to seamen
prior to the Jones Act, a shark bit off a seaman’s leg after he fell overboard
and the captain still continued on with the voyage.128 The trial court
awarded the seaman $1,500, explaining that the courts’ duty was not only
to “compensate the seaman for his unnecessary and unmerited suffering
real injuries and personal wrongs sustained by the libellants, but they are not
bound to the extent of vindictive damages.” (emphasis added)).
121. See id. at 547.
122. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 430 (2009) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
123. 39 F. 807 (D. Or. 1889).
124. Id. at 810–12.
125. Id. at 817 (quoting The City of Alexandria, 17 F. 390, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1883)).
126. Id. (“Measured by this rule I estimate and assess these damages as
follows: Hospital expenses for five months at $1 per day, $150; expense of
trephining, $150; expense of journey to Liverpool, $200;—in all $500. This
includes nothing for pain, suffering, or inconvenience resulting from the injury,
whether temporary or permanent. He is entitled to wages until his return home or
the end of the voyage, which will be about a year. This is £6, or $30. In addition
to this, the libelant must have damages for the gross neglect and mistreatment he
received after the injury, whereby his injury and suffering were much
aggravated.”). Similarly in The Troop, a seaman was injured after falling from a
mast, but the captain continued the voyage for thirty-six days; consequently, the
seaman was required to undergo surgery upon his return home. 118 F. 769, 769–
70, 773 (D. Wash. 1902). In this case, the court gave the seaman an
undifferentiated award of $4,000 with no mention of any punitive or exemplary
element, only criticism of the captain’s behavior. Id. at 773.
127. 140 F. 820 (5th Cir. 1905).
128. Id. at 820.
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when the duty of the ship is disregarded, but to emphasize the importance
of humane and correct judgment under the circumstances on the part of the
master.”129 The award did not contain any language regarding “punitive” or
“exemplary” damages; rather, the award again appears to only compensate
the seaman for his injuries, pain and suffering, and the worsened condition
and aggravation of the injury.130 Even if this trial court award contained a
punitive element, the Fifth Circuit ultimately reversed the award of
damages.131
Although none of these cases contain a clear award of punitive damages
to a seaman, courts in this era often did not draw a fine distinction between
punitive and compensatory damages.132 In many cases, determining whether
the judge intended the monetary award to contain elements of punishment
and deterrence may be impossible.133 Regardless of whether punitive
damages have been historically available to seamen under general maritime
law, some cases after the enactment of the Jones Act reasoned that the
availability of punitive damages hinges instead on whether the damages are
allowed under statutes that Congress enacted.134
2. The Analogy to Loss of Society Damages After the Jones Act
Fundamental conflict exists between the concurrent authority of
Congress and the courts to determine the substantive law in admiralty.135
Similar to the conflict concerning unseaworthiness punitive damages, the
Court has addressed the problem of statutory preemption as it relates to
loss of society damages in maritime law.136 In American Export Lines, Inc.
v. Alvez,137 the Court held that a wife could recover loss of society damages
resulting from nonfatal injuries that her husband suffered.138 Because the
129. Id. at 828.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 824 (“Having in contemplation the whole case, and especially
considering that the appellee received all the care and attention from the master
and his fellow seamen it was possible to give on a freighting ship . . . we conclude
that the master is not chargeable with fault or neglect in failing to deviate from
his course to procure such aid.”).
132. See Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 84.
133. See, e.g., The City of Carlisle, 39 F. 807, 817 (D.C. Or. 1889).
134. See infra Part II.B.2.
135. See supra Part I.A.
136. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990).
137. 446 U.S. 274 (1980).
138. Id. at 276. “The term ‘society’ embraces a broad range of mutual benefits
each family member receives from the others’ continued existence, including
love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection.” SeaLand Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974). Technically, Alvez was a
harbor worker classified as a “Sieracki seaman” prior to the 1972 amendments.
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Court had previously decided in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet that a
spouse could recover loss of society through a wrongful-death action
under general maritime law,139 the Alvez Court reasoned that “[w]ithin this
single body of judge-formulated law, there is no apparent reason to
differentiate between fatal and nonfatal injuries.”140 At the time Alvez was
decided, the Court found irrelevant that the Jones Act precluded recovery
for loss of society stating that “a remedial omission in the Jones Act is not
evidence of considered congressional policymaking that should command
our adherence in analogous contexts.”141 Although the Jones Act did not
control the Court’s decision in Alvez, which concerned a maritime worker
not covered by the Act, the Court has held that the Jones Act does control
the remedies available to a true seaman.142
In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., the Court held that loss of society
damages were unavailable in a wrongful-death action for unseaworthiness
because the Jones Act prohibits non-pecuniary recovery.143 The Court
reasoned that seamen no longer have to rely solely on the courts for
protection because Congress has legislated extensively in the area of
maritime tort remedies and as a result, the courts must look primarily to
congressional legislation and stay within those limits.144 Miles was not the
Alvez, 446 U.S. at 276 n.2 (“Alvez’ injury was sustained before the effective date of
the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act.” (citation omitted)).
139. 414 U.S. at 575–76 (concerning the Death on the High Seas Act).
140. Alvez, 446 U.S. at 281.
141. Id. at 282–84 (“Nor do we read the Jones Act as sweeping aside general
maritime law remedies. Notwithstanding our sometime treatment of longshoremen
as pseudo-seamen for certain Jones Act purposes, the Jones Act does not
exhaustively or exclusively regulate longshoremen’s remedies. Furthermore, the
Jones Act lacks such preclusive effect even with respect to true seamen; thus, we
have held that federal maritime law permits the dependents of seamen killed within
territorial seas to recover for violation of a duty of seaworthiness that entails a
stricter standard of care than the Jones Act.” (citations omitted)).
142. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32–33 (1990).
143. Id. (“It would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional scheme
were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially created cause of
action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases of
death resulting from negligence. We must conclude that there is no recovery for
loss of society in a general maritime action for the wrongful death of a Jones Act
seaman.”).
144. Id. at 27 (“We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved ones
must look primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protection from
injury and death; Congress and the States have legislated extensively in these
areas. In this era, an admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative
enactments for policy guidance. We may supplement these statutory remedies
where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of such policies consistent
with our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep strictly within the limits
imposed by Congress. Congress retains superior authority in these matters, and an
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first case to use this statutory preemption reasoning. The Court reached
the same conclusion in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,145 regarding the
Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”).146 The Court held that loss of
society damages should not be awarded under general maritime law in a nonseaman wrongful-death action because, at the time of the Court’s decision,
Congress limited recovery under DOHSA to pecuniary losses.147 The Miles
reasoning has since been applied in varying maritime contexts, particularly in
the availability of punitive damages.148 Whether the applicability of Miles is
limited to wrongful death actions, however, is unclear.149
admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-considered boundaries
imposed by federal legislation.”).
145. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
146. Id. at 625; Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 (“Respondents argued that admiralty
courts have traditionally undertaken to supplement maritime statutes. The Court’s
answer in Higginbotham is fully consistent with those principles we have here
derived from Moragne: Congress has spoken directly to the question of
recoverable damages on the high seas, and ‘when it does speak directly to a
question, the courts are not free to “supplement” Congress’ answer so thoroughly
that the Act becomes meaningless.’ Moragne involved gap filling in an area left
open by statute; supplementation was entirely appropriate. But in an ‘area covered
by the statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of
damages than to prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different class of
beneficiaries.’” (citiations omitted)); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §
30302 (2012) (“When the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the
shore of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may bring
a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel responsible. The action
shall be for the exclusive benefit of the decedent’s spouse, parent, child, or
dependent relative.”).
147. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625 (“Congress did not limit DOHSA
beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary losses in order to encourage the
creation of nonpecuniary supplements.”). The current version of DOHSA,
however, allows for the recovery of nonpecuniary losses in commercial aviation
accidents beyond twelve nautical miles. 46 U.S.C. § 30307(b) (2012) (“In an
action under this chapter, if the death resulted from a commercial aviation
accident occurring on the high seas beyond 12 nautical miles from the shore of
the United States, additional compensation is recoverable for nonpecuniary
damages, but punitive damages are not recoverable.”).
148. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf
of Mexico, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 4575696, at *11 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2011)
(applying the reasoning of Miles to conclude that seamen do not have a remedy
of punitive damages for personal injuries, but punitive damages are available to
non-seamen).
149. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 3353044, at
*10–11 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2014) (“In sum, a general maritime claim of unseaworthiness
can support a punitive damages award when brought directly by an injured seaman,
but not when brought by a seaman’s personal representative as part of a wrongful
death or survival action. Put simply, the remedy of punitive damages exists as it
did prior to the passage of the Jones Act, and thus does not survive a seaman’s
death.”).
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3. The Default Rule: Punitive Damages are Available under General
Maritime Law
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,150 which concerned the infamous
Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Court held that the Clean Water Act’s prohibition
on the recovery of punitive damages did “not bar a punitive award on top of
damages for economic loss, but that the award . . . should be limited to an
amount equal to compensatory damages.”151 In creating this 1:1 ratio
between compensatory and punitive damages under general maritime
common law, the Court reasoned that “no clear indication of congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies” were evident.152
Commentators have used Baker to argue that punitive damages should be
made available to seamen, who, as the wards of admiralty, should be
entitled to more protections than the non-seamen plaintiffs in this oil spill
case.153 Considering the bar to recovery for negligence in The Osceola,
however, courts have not always given seamen every possible remedy
under general maritime law.154 Soon after the Court’s decision in Baker,
the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of whether punitive
damages are available to seamen for their employers’ failure to pay
maintenance and cure.155
4. The Court’s Maiden Voyage into Punitive Damages for Seamen
In 2009, the Supreme Court held in Townsend156 that seamen could
recover punitive damages “for the willful and wanton disregard of the
maintenance and cure obligation . . . in the appropriate case[s] as a matter
of general maritime law.”157 The Court based its decision on three main
points.158 First, the Court recognized the general availability of punitive
damages under the common law by indulging in a lengthy discussion of
150. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
151. Id. at 476.
152. Id. at 489 (citation omitted).
153. David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles,
Baker, and Townsend, 70 LA. L. REV. 463, 477 (2010) [hereinafter Miles, Baker,
and Townsend] (“The parties awarded punitive damages in Baker were ‘commercial
fishermen, Native Alaskans, and landowners;’ the Court had no occasion to directly
address seamen’s rights. However, it is hard to fathom how seamen, who by long
tradition are admiralty’s most favored litigants, could somehow be worse off under
federal maritime law than fishermen and landowners.” (quoting Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008))).
154. See 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
155. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 424.
158. Id. at 414.
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the English and American traditions regarding damages for outrageous
conduct.159 Second, the Court reasoned that the common law tradition of
punitive damages extends to maritime claims.160 The Court reviewed cases
decided before the Jones Act, where the availability of punitive damages
in the maritime context was generally acknowledged; however, none of
these cases involved a clear punitive award to seamen.161 Third, the Court
found no evidence that maintenance and cure actions were excluded from
this general maritime law rule and that nothing in the Jones Act precluded
such recovery.162 The Court determined that the Jones Act did not
eliminate pre-existing remedies that were available to seamen prior to its
enactment.163 Although the Court undermined the Miles uniformity
principle by finding that this principle did not apply in the maintenance
and cure context,164 the Townsend Court unequivocally reaffirmed Miles
by stating that its reasoning “remains sound.”165
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Alito, sharply criticized the
majority’s failure to apply the Miles analytical framework.166 Justice Alito
argued that Miles endorsed a principle of uniformity, “that if a form of
relief is not available on a statutory claim, we should be reluctant to permit
such relief on a similar claim brought under general maritime law.”167 He
reasoned that because punitive damages are not available under the Jones
Act, they should likewise be unavailable to seamen under general maritime
common law for actions related to personal injury.168 The dissent also
attacked the cases the majority used for its proposition that punitive
damages have been historically available, arguing that whether punitive
159. Id. at 409–10.
160. Id. at 414.
161. Id. at 411–14; see discussion supra Part II.B.1.
162. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 414–15.
163. Id. at 415. “Further supporting this interpretation of the Jones Act, this
Court has consistently recognized that the Act ‘was remedial, for the benefit and
protection of seamen who are peculiarly the wards of admiralty. Its purpose was
to enlarge that protection, not to narrow it.’” Id. at 417 (quoting The Arizona v.
Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936)).
164. Id. at 424 (“The laudable quest for uniformity in admiralty does not
require the narrowing of available damages to the lowest common denominator
approved by Congress for distinct causes of action.”).
165. Id. at 420.
166. Id. at 425 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 426.
168. Id. at 428 (“When Congress incorporated FELA unaltered into the Jones
Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate FELA’s limitation on damages
as well. . . . It is therefore reasonable to assume that only compensatory damages
may be recovered under the Jones Act. And under Miles’ reasoning—at least in
the absence of some exceptionally strong countervailing considerations—the rule
should be the same when a seaman sues under general maritime law for personal
injury resulting from the denial of maintenance and cure.” (citations omitted)).

640

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

damages were ever actually recovered in those cases is unclear.169 Alito
contended that the “cases found are insufficient in number, clarity, and
prominence to justify departure from the Miles uniformity principle.”170 The
Court’s decision in Townsend sent waves through the maritime industry171
but left unanswered whether punitive damages are available in another
general maritime law cause of action for seamen—unseaworthiness.
In McBride, the Fifth Circuit answered one of the many questions that
Townsend left open in holding that unseaworthiness punitive damages are
unavailable.172 The significance of the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in
McBride cannot be understated. The issues the case raised are of national
importance, including the questions of how far the reasoning of Townsend
should extend, whether the Miles uniformity principle is still good law to
be applied in the context of punitive damages, and the role of Congress
and the courts in determining maritime law.
III. UNSEAWORTHINESS PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD
REMAIN UNAVAILABLE
Unseaworthiness punitive damages should not be available to seamen
under general maritime law for three reasons. First, the reasoning of
Townsend does not extend to unseaworthiness.173 The historic availability
of punitive damages for seamen is scarce, particularity for unseaworthiness.
Further, maintenance and cure is a fundamentally different type of claim,
such that the availability of those damages in that context is irrelevant.174
Second, punitive damages are not available for a negligence action under
the Jones Act, and that unavailability should extend to unseaworthiness
because the two claims typically involve a single legal wrong.175 Third, no
logical reason for drawing a distinction between personal injury and
wrongful death recovery for unseaworthiness exists, and as such, punitive
damages should be unavailable under both theories of recovery.176
Therefore, the Supreme Court should reach the same result as the Fifth
169. Id. at 430 (“[A] search for cases in which punitive damages were awarded
for the willful denial of maintenance and cure—in an era when seamen were often
treated with shocking callousness—yields very little.”).
170. Id. at 431.
171. Rod Sullivan, Enforcing a Seaman’s Right to Medical Care After Atlantic
Sounding v. Townsend, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 2 (2009) (discussing the practical
problems that shipowners, seamen, and their maritime lawyers must face in the
wake of the Townsend decision).
172. McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2014).
173. See infra Part III.A.
174. See infra Part III.A.
175. See infra Part III.B.
176. See infra Part III.C.
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Circuit in McBride and hold that unseaworthiness punitive damages are
not available to seamen.177
A. Townsend Does Not Control Unseaworthiness
The holding of Townsend should not be extended to allow for
unseaworthiness punitive damages.178 The primary dissent in McBride
clarified the Townsend rule as follows: “if a general maritime law cause of
action and remedy were established before the passage of the Jones Act, and
the Jones Act did not address that cause of action or remedy, then that
remedy remains available under that cause of action unless and until
Congress intercedes.”179 The McBride dissent, however, misapplied this rule
because, unlike maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness punitive damages
do not appear to be historically established prior to the Jones Act.180
Moreover, even if punitive damages were historically available for
maintenance and cure, that availability does not extend to unseaworthiness,
which is a separate and independent legal wrong that has significant overlap
with the Jones Act.181
1. No Punitive Damages Awarded to Seamen Prior to the Jones Act
Although Townsend correctly stated that courts recognized the potential
availability of punitive damages to seamen prior to the Jones Act, apparently
no court during that era actually awarded punitive relief to a seaman.182
Justice Alito acknowledged in his Townsend dissent that the search for cases
177. See infra Part III.D.
178. The technical holding of Townsend is that seamen can recover punitive
damages “for the willful and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure
obligation . . . in the appropriate case[s] as a matter of general maritime law.” 557
U.S. 404, 424 (2009).
179. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 412 (5th Cir. 2014)
(en banc) (Higginson, J., dissenting). The court also stated:
The settled legal principles discussed above establish three points central
to resolving this case. First, punitive damages have long been available
at common law. Second, the common-law tradition of punitive damages
extends to maritime claims. And third, there is no evidence that claims
for maintenance and cure were excluded from this general admiralty rule.
Instead, the pre-Jones Act evidence indicates that punitive damages
remain available for such claims under the appropriate factual
circumstances. As a result, respondent is entitled to pursue punitive
damages unless Congress has enacted legislation departing from this
common-law understanding.
Id. at 412–13 n.14 (citing Townsend, 557 U.S. at 414–15).
180. See infra Part III.A.1.
181. See infra Part III.B.
182. See infra note 192.
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that awarded punitive damages to seamen prior to the Jones Act produces
scarce results.183 Upon a deeper analysis of the cases cited by the Townsend
majority, the possibility that the damages contained any punitive element is
unlikely.184 Although some scholars have alleged that these courts awarded
punitive damages to seamen because employers failed to pay maintenance
and cure, only a single unseaworthiness case during this time has been
purported to contain an award of punitive damages.185 In The Rolph, a first
mate with “a reputation for ferocity as wide as the seven seas” struck a
seaman with a knot in a rope, causing serious injury.186 The court held that
the employment of the brutal first mate rendered the ship an unseaworthy
vessel, and the plaintiffs could therefore recover damages.187 Nevertheless,
the damages awarded appear to merely compensate the seaman because the
court only considered medical expenses and wages in its calculations.188
Some scholars have argued that the reason these old cases do not appear
to contain punitive awards is because courts have not made the distinction
between punitive and compensatory damages until recently, leading these
commentators to conclude that the punitive awards are hidden within a more
general award.189 Even accepting that common law courts may have
regarded punitive damages as “exemplary” or “vindictive,” however, no
case before the Jones Act has been reported where this language was used
in relation to a seaman’s award.190 One scholar has claimed that “[t]he
weight of the jurisprudence is overwhelming: nineteenth-century seamen

183. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 431 (Alito, J., dissenting) (The search for
“maintenance and cure cases in which punitive damages were awarded yields
strikingly slim results.”).
184. See supra Part II.B.1.
185. See The Rolph, 293 F. 269 (N.D. Cal. 1923), aff’d, 299 F. 52 (9th Cir.
1924). Note that this case does not even pre-date the Jones Act but was decided a
mere three years after.
186. Id. at 269–70.
187. Id. at 272.
188. See id. (the court’s only language concerning damages is as follows:
“Inasmuch as the injuries were fully set forth in the testimony by medical and
other witnesses, the expectation of life and earnings of these men were laid before
the court, there is no necessity for a reference to a commissioner in the usual
manner. The decree, therefore, will provide that the judgment be, for Kohilas, in
the sum of $10,000; for Kapstein, in the sum of $3,500; for Seppinnen and
Arnesen, in the sum of $500.”).
189. Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 83 (“The term that best emphasizes
this function is exemplary damages. This is the preferable term. It is not archaic.
It emphasizes the right function. And its connotations are less harsh than those of
‘punitive,’ connotations that further the rhetorical aims of those who would
abolish the right to recover such damages. But the ‘punitive’ term has gained
ascendancy.”).
190. See id. at 103–08.
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indisputably had the right to seek punitive damages.”191 To the contrary,
the jurisprudence is actually quite underwhelming because, in the cases
cited by leading commentators and the courts as evidence that punitive
damages have always been available to seamen, no reported case appears
to have awarded punitive damages to a seaman prior to the Jones Act.192
191. Miles, Baker, and Townsend, supra note 151, at 482‒83.
192. See Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 103‒08. To state with
particularity, the cases cited in this article for the proposition that punitive
damages were awarded or available to seamen prior to the Jones Act are as
follows: Pac. Packing & Navigation Co. v. Fielding, 136 F. 577, 580 (9th Cir.
1905) (the Ninth Circuit held that the punitive award of the trial court was
erroneous); The Margharita, 140 F. 820 (5th Cir. 1905) (discussed supra Part
II.B.1); The City of Carlisle, 39 F. 807 (D. Or. 1889) (discussed supra Part II.B.1);
The Troop, 118 F. 769 (D. Wash. 1902) (discussed supra Part II.B.1); The Rolph,
293 F. at 272 (discussed supra note 186). See also Miles, Baker, and Townsend,
supra note 151, at 479–83. The cases asserted in this article that punitive damages
were available or awarded prior to the Jones Act are: The Svealand, 136 F. 109,
113 (4th Cir. 1905) (“[T]he court thinks that an award of $500 should be made to
the libelant for the additional suffering imposed upon him, and for the apparently
aggravated character of the injury he sustained; the same to be paid in addition to
all expenses incurred for medical treatment and cure of libelant, which in this case
have been considerable, and on account of which the damages are fixed at so small
an amount.”); Swift v. The Happy Return, 23 F. Cas 560, 561 n.2 (D. Pa. 1799)
(judge merely discussed threatening a shipowner with a judicially-created
monetary penalty in a completely different case); Gould v. Christianson, 10 F.
Cas. 857, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1836) (“The considerations before suggested will, in this
case, augment the damages beyond a mere remuneration for the bodily injury
sustained by the libellant, but will not entitle him to vindictive or aggravated
damages.” (emphasis added)); The Scotland, 42 F. 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1890)
(“[N]o punitive damages should be given, but only such as may fairly compensate
the libelant for his actual loss through the delay in proper treatment.”); The
Vigilant, 30 F. 288, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1887) (“Had I not been entirely satisfied of the
master's good faith in his conduct, as well as of his intent to treat the seaman
kindly and justly, I should have felt bound to add considerably to the sum above
named.”); The Childe Harold, 5 F. Cas. 619, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1846) (stating that
“punitive and compensatory” damages would be appropriate if the ship had fed
rotten food to the crew, but there was no such award in this case); Unica v. United
States, 287 F. 177, 180 (S.D. Ala. 1923) (although the court called the conduct
“inexcusable,” it posed a question which clearly indicated the purpose of the
award was to compensate for pain and suffering: “What should be given him for
this suffering? I know of no measure by which I can accurately determine it. Who
would be willing to undergo it for any fixed compensation? A decree will be
entered, fixing his damages at $1,500.”); Tomlinson v. Hewett, 24 F. Cas. 29, 32
(D. Cal. 1872) (award was merely called “large” by the court); Latchimacker v.
Jacksonville Towing & Wrecking Co., 181 F. 276, 278–79 (S.D. Fla. 1910), aff'd,
184 F. 987 (5th Cir. 1910) (reversing a jury verdict that contained “exemplary”
damages); Sheridan v. Furbur, 21 F. Cas. 1266, 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1834) (stating “I
should be disposed to visit such intemperate conduct with a punishment in
damages corresponding to the wantonness of the wrong, . . .” but no such award
was given); Brown v. Howard, 14 Johns. 119, 123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817) (stating
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Although some trial courts awarded seamen punitive damages, those
awards were reversed on appeal.193 The courts may have condemned the
behavior of the shipowners in these cases, but the awards all appear
compensatory in nature.194 Townsend argued that courts consistently
recognized that punitive damages were available to seaman; however, the
fact that those damages were never actually awarded undermines the
strength and reach of the Court’s reasoning .195 Punitive damages should
not be available to seamen because even though the remedy may have been
“available” prior to the Jones Act, no court probably ever awarded this
remedy.196
A likely response to this assertion is that, although courts did not
award punitive damages to seamen prior to the Jones Act, their availability
was generally recognized.197 A sweeping judicial expansion of a remedy,
however, should not be based solely on mere possibility.198 Rather, in the
absence of clear historical awards of punitive damages to seamen, the
courts should be reluctant to expand recovery under maritime claims and
should instead defer such an important policy decision to Congress as a
law-making body.199
2. Maintenance and Cure is a Separate and Independent Claim from
Unseaworthiness
The reasoning of Townsend does not extend to unseaworthiness
because maintenance and cure is, by its nature, a completely different type
of action.200 Although both are general maritime law claims recognized by
The Osceola as remedies available to seamen,201 they involve two separate
legal wrongs. In contrast to unseaworthiness, the failure to pay
maintenance and cure is a second injury occurring after the legal wrong
that causes the initial injury to the seaman, specifically the unseaworthy
“conduct of the captain merits severe animadversion” but no mention of an
award).
193. See supra note 192.
194. See supra note 192.
195. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 412 (2009) (“In short,
prior to enactment of the Jones Act in 1920, ‘maritime jurisprudence was replete
with judicial statements approving punitive damages, especially on behalf of
passengers and seamen.’” (quoting Punitive Damages, supra note 47, at 115)).
196. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 412–13 n.14 (5th Cir.
2014) (en banc) (Higginson, J., dissenting).
197. See supra note 192 (many of the cases do acknowledge the potential
availability of punitive damages).
198. See McBride, 768 F.3d at 404 (Haynes, J., concurring).
199. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
200. See supra Part I.B.1–2.
201. See 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
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condition of the vessel.202 Townsend recognized this distinction by
emphasizing that “a seaman’s action for maintenance and cure is
‘independent’ and ‘cumulative’ from other claims.”203 The failure to pay
maintenance and cure is an intentional act by an employer who knows
what an injured seaman should be owed, yet refuses to tender payment of
medical care and living expenses.204 On the other hand, unseaworthiness
requires no intent on the part of the employer, because the unreasonable
condition of the vessel can exist without knowledge.205 Whereas the cause
of action for the failure to pay maintenance and cure is a quasi-contractual
obligation that arises after the injury, unseaworthiness and Jones Act
negligence claims concern the work-related accident itself.206
Although some have argued that the duty to provide a seaworthy
vessel is also a quasi-contractual claim, the nature of unseaworthiness is
more closely aligned to personal injury.207 Although the shipowner’s duty
to provide a seaworthy vessel arises from the master-servant relationship
and incident of the seaman’s employment contract, this duty is more
similar to a reasonableness standard of care in tort law.208 The shipowner’s
duty to provide a vessel reasonably fit for its intended use is comparable
to a standard of care, the breach of which causes personal injury to the
seaman.209 By contrast, the failure to pay maintenance and cure violates
the contractual obligation to provide support to a seaman after injury—the
legal wrong itself does not concern personal injury.210 Thus, the Supreme
Court’s holding that punitive damages are available for maintenance and
cure does not automatically extend to unseaworthiness simply because
both are general maritime law claims.211
202. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, § 6:23, at 342.
203. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 (2009) (quoting Pac.
S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1928)); see also Punitive Damages,
supra note 47, at 147.
204. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 543 (1960).
205. See id. at 550.
206. See supra Part I.B.2–3.
207. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 3353044, at *8
(E.D. Pa. July 9, 2014) (“[U]nseaworthiness claims also have a contractual
component, as they arise from the master’s duty to provide his servants with a
seaworthy ship. As with the duty to provide an injured seaman with food and
medical care, that duty is firmly anchored in the master/servant relationship . . . .”).
208. See id.
209. See Trawler Racer, 362 U.S. at 550.
210. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); but see Atl. Sounding Co. v.
Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 422 (2009) (“[I]t also is true that the negligent denial of
maintenance and cure may also be the subject of a Jones Act claim.”).
211. For similar reasons, maintenance and cure does not overlap with a
negligence action under the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012). Some courts,
however, have asserted such a connection by relying on Cortes v. Baltimore Insular
Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932), which arguably reasoned that maintenance and
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3. No Sound Reasoning for Unseaworthiness Punitive Damages After
the Jones Act
After the passage of the Jones Act, some courts held that seamen could
recover punitive damages for unseaworthiness.212 The Fifth Circuit held in the
case of In re Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc.213 that “punitive damages may
be recovered under general maritime law upon a showing of willful and
wanton misconduct by the shipowner in the creation or maintenance of
unseaworthy conditions.”214 The court cited to various authorities to support
this proposition, but only one of these cases actually awarded punitive
damages.215 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits soon followed the Fifth Circuit’s
lead.216 Merry Shipping was fundamentally flawed, however, because the
court reasoned that the Jones Act and unseaworthiness were separable, that
different classes of damages could be awarded for each, and that a

cure arose under the Jones Act for equitable, not legal, reasons. Id. at 373–74. In
Cortes, a seaman died because the shipowner failed to get him to a hospital in
time, but the administrator of his estate could not recover any damages because a
right of action for the denial of maintenance and cure ended with his death. Id. at
370 (at this time no general maritime law action for wrongful death existed). The
Court reasoned that maintenance and cure overlapped with the Jones Act—which
had a wrongful death action—likely to avoid the inequitable result of a shipowner
not having to pay damages because the seaman died. Id. at 375. Therefore, the
Court would not want to create an incentive to kill seamen to avoid the payment
of maintenance and cure. Id. at 375. But see De Centeno v. Gulf Fleet Crews, Inc.,
798 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that under the Jones Act, a shipowner
negligently failed to provide adequate medical treatment to a seaman, often called
“found”).
212. See In re Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.
1981).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 623.
215. In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1972) (punitive
damages could be recovered upon a showing that the defendant was guilty of gross
misconduct, but finding no such misconduct on the facts before it, the court upheld
the denial of punitive damages); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th
Cir. 1969) (punitive damages were available upon a showing of the shipowner’s
reckless conduct, but the court reversed the trial court’s award of such damages
finding that the evidence was insufficient to support it); Baptiste v. Superior Court
for Cnty. of L.A., 106 Cal. App. 3d 87 (Ct. App. 1980) (punitive damages were
available under general maritime law, and the court ordered the trial court to
reinstate plaintiff’s claim for such damages).
216. See Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Punitive
damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness
. . . .”); Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1550 (11th Cir.
1987) (“Punitive damages should be available in cases where the shipowner
willfully violated the duty to maintain a safe and seaworthy ship . . . .”).
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congressional statute could not bar recovery under general maritime law.217
An intimate relationship exists between unseaworthiness and Jones Act
negligence that does not similarly exist for maintenance and cure, and the
Townsend Court even acknowledged this settled principle.218 Because both
claims usually involve a single legal wrong, only one compensatory
recovery should be available between unseaworthiness and the Jones
Act.219
Moreover, courts have recognized that Miles, which held that Jones
Act recovery controlled unseaworthiness, overruled Merry Shipping and
its progeny.220 The Court’s decision in Townsend should not bring Merry
Shipping back from its watery grave because the Townsend Court
reaffirmed the sound reasoning of Miles.221 Punitive damages should not
be available in unseaworthiness because the Jones Act addressed a similar
legal wrong in its negligence action, and the erroneous reasoning of Merry
Shipping has been overruled or at the very least was called into serious
question after the Supreme Court’s decision in Miles.222
B. The Unavailability of Jones Act Punitive Damages Extends to
Unseaworthiness
Unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence are fundamentally two
aspects of the same cause of action, where a seaman is entitled to just one
indemnity by way of compensatory damages.223 Accordingly, under the
Miles uniformity principle, unseaworthiness punitive damages are
217. Merry Shipping, 650 F.2d at 626 (“It does not follow, however, that if
punitive damages are not allowed under the Jones Act, they should also not be
allowed under general maritime law. First, unlike the Jones Act, no statutory
restraints bar recovery under general maritime law. This body of law is wholly a
product of judicial decisionmaking, fashioned on the basis of tradition and
policy.” (footnote omitted)).
218. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009) (“It is
unquestioned law that both the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness remedies are
additional to maintenance and cure: the seaman may have maintenance and cure
and also one of the other two.” (quoting GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, §
6:23, at 342)); see also infra Part III.B.
219. See infra Part III.B.
220. See Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1507 (5th Cir.
1995) (“After Miles, it is clear that Merry Shipping has been effectively overruled.
Its holding—that punitive damages are available in a wrongful death action
brought by the representative of a seaman under the unseaworthiness doctrine of
the general maritime law—is no longer good law in light of the Miles uniformity
principle because, in the factual scenario of Merry Shipping, the Jones Act
damages limitations control.”), abrogated by Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
221. See Townsend, 557 U.S. at 420 (“The reasoning of Miles remains sound.”).
222. See Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1507.
223. See Pac. S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928).
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unavailable because such damages are not available under the Jones
Act.224
1. Punitive Damages Are Not Available Under the Jones Act
The Jones Act imported into maritime law the same negligence action
and remedies available to railroad workers against their employers for
injury and wrongful death under the FELA.225 When the Jones Act was
enacted, FELA was uniformly interpreted by the Supreme Court to limit
the available remedies solely and exclusively to compensatory damages
for pecuniary losses.226 In Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Vreeland,227
the Court described the remedies available under FELA for wrongful death
as follows: “[i]t is a liability for the loss and damage sustained by relatives
dependent upon the decedent. It is therefore a liability for the pecuniary
damage resulting to them and for that only.”228 The Court echoed this
statement in Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. McGinnis,229
unequivocally specifying that, “[i]n a series of cases lately decided by this
court, the act in this aspect has been construed as intended only to
compensate . . . for the actual pecuniary loss resulting to the particular
person or persons for whose benefit an action is given.”230 Miles
recognized that the FELA limitation on damages, which under Vreeland
is limited to compensation for pecuniary losses, extends to the Jones Act
because the Court “assume[s] that Congress is aware of existing law when
it passes legislation.”231 Although this matter appeared to be settled, the
Supreme Court opened the door to debate on the issue by dodging the
question in Townsend.232
224. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
225. Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012).
“Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of,
a railway employee apply to an action under this section.” Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §
30104 (2012).
226. See Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 (1913).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 68.
229. 228 U.S. 173 (1913).
230. Id. at 175.
231. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“When Congress
passed the Jones Act, the Vreeland gloss on FELA, and the hoary tradition behind
it, were well established. Incorporating FELA unaltered into the Jones Act,
Congress must have intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on damages
as well.”).
232. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 n.12 (2009)
(“Because we hold that Miles does not render the Jones Act’s damages provision
determinative of respondent’s remedies, we do not address the dissent’s argument
that the Jones Act, by incorporating the provisions of the Federal Employers’
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The current debate on whether punitive damages are available under
the Jones Act hinges on the classification of punitive damages as either
pecuniary or non-pecuniary.233 Some argue that punitive damages are
pecuniary because they are susceptible of valuation in money and that
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker confirmed the pecuniary nature of punitive
damages by developing its ratio for recovery in maritime law.234 Others
claim the jurisprudence has consistently recognized punitive damages as
non-pecuniary, and no support exists to deviate from that conclusion.235
Regardless, the Court’s interpretation of the Vreeland gloss on the Jones
Act is clear: recovery is limited to compensation for pecuniary losses.236
As such, punitive damages should not be available under either
classification system because even if these damages are pecuniary, they
do not provide compensation for losses.237 Considering that the word
“pecuniary” has broad application, the Court’s language indicates that the
more important word is “loss,” meaning that the goal is to compensate
plaintiffs for their losses.238 Punitive damages do not compensate for a
plaintiff’s loss; rather, these damages are designed to punish the defendant.
For clarity, using the Court’s language in Pacific Steamship Co. v.
Liability Act prohibits the recovery of punitive damages in actions under that
statute.” (citation omitted)).
233. See Miles, Baker, and Townsend, supra note 151, at 473.
234. Id. (“[P]unitive damages can sensibly be called pecuniary. They are
awarded as money, can be estimated-and-as recently exhaustively analyzed by the
Supreme Court in Baker-are awarded as ‘measured retribution.’” (citation
omitted)).
235. Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1984); see
also Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987); Miller v. Am.
President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1454–59 (6th Cir. 1993); Horsley v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 15 F.3d 200, 202–03 (1st Cir. 1994); Guevara v. Maritime Overseas
Corp, 59 F.3d 1496, 1506 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Townsend, 557 U.S. 404
(2009); Neal v. Barisich, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 862, 873 (E.D. La. 1989); Anderson
v. Texaco, Inc. 797 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. La. 1992).
236. See Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173, 175‒76
(1913). The Graves dissent in McBride makes an intriguing argument that if
recovery is truly limited to compensation for pecuniary losses, then a seaman
would not be entitled to damages for pain and suffering because such is a
compensatory damage that is not easily susceptible of valuation in money: “The
majority briefly implies that ‘pecuniary damages’ are broadly equivalent to
‘compensatory’ damages.” McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382,
422 (5th Cir. 2014) (Graves, J., dissenting). “[I]f we accept the majority’s
unexplained implication that pecuniary damages must be equivalent to
compensatory damages, it is not clear why loss of society would not have been
recoverable in Miles or Higginbotham, as it is not at all clear why loss of society
damages are any less compensatory in nature than damages for pain and
suffering.” Id. at 424. This question, however, is outside the scope of
unseaworthiness punitive damages.
237. See McGinnis, 228 U.S. at 175–76.
238. See id.

650

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

Peterson239 as a guide is preferable, which clarified that a seaman is only
entitled to one indemnity of compensatory damages resulting from
unseaworthiness or the negligence of his employer.240
2. The Jones Act and Unseaworthiness are Intimately Limited to One
Indemnity
Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness have been called the
“Siamese twins” of admiralty because they both involve a single legal
wrong.241 Courts have acknowledged that unseaworthiness has been
significantly expanded, and it currently resembles something close to a
negligence action under the Jones Act.242 Commentators have long
recognized that the claims are “inseparable and indivisible parts of a single
cause of action.”243 The Court in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.244
affirmed this view in stating that unseaworthiness and negligence under
the Jones Act are “but alternative ‘grounds’ of recovery for a single cause
of action.”245 The intimate connection between the two claims, unlike the
tenuous link to maintenance and cure, demands consistent remedies.246
The Supreme Court’s statement in Peterson best explains this principle:
[W]hether or not the seamen’s injuries were occasioned by the
unseaworthiness of the vessel or by the negligence of the master
or members of the crew, or both combined, there is but a single
wrongful invasion of his primary right of bodily safety and but a
single legal wrong . . . for which he is entitled to but one indemnity
by way of compensatory damages.247
This reasoning establishes that Jones Act negligence and
unseaworthiness are similar enough to constitute a single legal wrong or
239. 278 U.S. 130 (1928).
240. Id. at 138. The issue before the court, however, was not whether punitive
damages could be recovered under the Jones Act or unseaworthiness; the question
was actually whether a Jones Act seaman’s right to elect to bring a negligence
action was barred by his receipt of maintenance and cure benefits. Id. at 139.
241. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, § 6:38, at 383.
242. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 418 (1953) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (“Since unseaworthiness affords . . . recovery without fault and has
been broadly construed by the courts, it will be rare that the circumstances of an injury
will constitute negligence but not unseaworthiness.”(citation omitted)).
243. See Kenneth G. Engerrand & Scott R. Brann, Troubled Waters for
Seamen’s Wrongful Death Actions, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 327, 348 (1981) (footnote
omitted).
244. 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
245. Id. at 225.
246. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 (2009).
247. Pac. S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928) (emphasis added).
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single invasion of a primary right.248 Further, the reasoning clarifies that a
seaman is entitled to a single recovery limited to compensatory damages,
and is prohibited from recovering punitive damages.249 The Court’s use of
the word “indemnity” is also significant because The Osceola uses that
exact same word used to describe the recovery for unseaworthiness.250 The
right to an indemnity includes only the ability to recover for losses and
should not be extended to punitive damages, which do not concern a
plaintiff’s loss.251 Notably, the “indemnity” limitation was not included in
The Osceola’s pronouncement of the remedy available for failure to pay
maintenance and cure.252
The persuasive language in Peterson, however, was not a clear holding
by the Supreme Court; rather, it could be interpreted as dicta because the
issue in that case was actually whether a Jones Act seaman’s receipt of
maintenance and cure benefits barred his right to elect to bring a
negligence action.253 The Court’s citation of the Peterson decision in
Townsend to describe the relationship between maintenance and cure,
unseaworthiness, and the Jones Act, however, is telling.254 In doing so, the
Court acknowledged that Peterson is an adequate authority on the
interplay between the claims available to seamen.255 Moreover, the Court
recognized even before The Osceola that a court goes beyond the limit of
an indemnity by awarding punitive damages.256 Taken together, these
248. Id.; see also McAllister, 357 U.S. at 225.
249. See Peterson, 278 U.S. at 138.
250. See 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903) (“That the vessel and her owner are, both
by English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by
seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply
and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.” (emphasis
added)).
251. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 837 (9th ed. 2009) (“A duty to make
good any loss, damage, or liability incurred by another. . . . The right of an injured
party to claim reimbursement for its loss, damage, or liability from a person who
has such a duty.”).
252. 189 U.S. at 175.
253. 278 U.S. at 139.
254. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 (2009) (emphasizing
that “a seaman’s action for maintenance and cure is ‘independent’ and ‘cumulative’
from other claims such as negligence and that the maintenance and cure right is
‘in no sense inconsistent with, or an alternative of, the right to recover
compensatory damages [under the Jones Act]’” (quoting Peterson, 278 U.S. at
138–39)).
255. See id.
256. See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 492
(1875) (“It is undoubtedly true that the allowance of any thing more than an
adequate pecuniary indemnity for a wrong suffered is a great departure from the
principle on which damages in civil suits are awarded. But although, as a general
rule, the plaintiff recovers merely such indemnity, yet the doctrine is too well
settled now to be shaken, that exemplary damages may in certain cases be
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cases stand for the proposition that even soon after the Jones Act’s passage,
courts generally recognized that both unseaworthiness and Jones Act
negligence concerned a single invasion of a primary right and that seamen
should have only one compensatory recovery between the two claims.257
Accordingly, seamen should be entitled to only one compensatory damage
award between unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence.258
3. Sailing in the Occupied the Waters of Congressional Action
According to the sound reasoning of Miles, Congress has occupied the
field of tort damages available to seamen.259 The Miles uniformity
principle provides that if a certain type of relief is not available under a
statutory claim, courts should be reluctant to permit that type of relief on
a similar claim brought under general maritime law.260 To support the
principle, the Court in Miles explained that courts should not overstep the
legislative limitations that Congress has imposed.261 Because punitive
damages are not available under the Jones Act, these damages should
likewise be unavailable for the related claim of unseaworthiness under
general maritime law.262 In some maritime contexts, the Court has found
supplementation of a statutory gap entirely appropriate.263 Miles, however,
responded to this argument, stating that “in an ‘area covered by the statute,
it would be no more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of
damages than to prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different
class of beneficiaries.’”264 Here, the Jones Act addresses the damages
recoverable in a personal injury action and therefore, supplementation in
the general maritime law would be inappropriate.265
By contrast, some argue that courts have construed Miles far too
broadly.266 Critics argue that courts should read Miles narrowly because
assessed.”); see also Christensen Eng’g Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 135
F. 774, 782 (2d Cir. 1905) (“It is obvious that a fine exceeding the indemnity to
which the complainant is entitled is purely punitive, and, notwithstanding the
foregoing precedents to the contrary, we think that when it is imposed by way of
indemnity to the aggrieved party it should not exceed his actual loss incurred . . . .”).
257. Balt. S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927).
258. Peterson, 278 U.S. at 138–39.
259. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
260. Id.; see also Townsend, 557 U.S. at 426 (Alito, J., dissenting).
261. Miles, 498 U.S. at 27.
262. Id.
263. See generally Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970)
(creating a wrongful death action under general maritime law).
264. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginson, 436 U.S.
618, 625 (1978)).
265. Id. at 27.
266. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 418–19 (2009).
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the Court in Townsend limited the preemptive effect of the Jones Act on
maintenance and cure.267 In addition, Townsend also stated that the
purpose of the Jones Act was not to limit remedies, but to expand them.268
Although Miles did not address maintenance and cure, the case directly
addressed the overlap between unseaworthiness and the Jones Act; it
concluded that because loss of society damages were not available under
the Jones Act, such damages should not be available in unseaworthiness.269
The Court unequivocally stated that “[i]t would be inconsistent with our
place in the constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive
remedies in a judicially-created cause of action in which liability is without
fault than Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from
negligence.”270 The legal overlap between Jones Act negligence and
unseaworthiness is still good law, and the Supreme Court has not
addressed the overlap since Miles.271 That the purpose of the Jones Act
was to expand the remedies available to seamen, but Congress intended to
expand recovery by creating a single cause of action—to simply give
seamen a negligence action against their employers.272 Moreover, Miles
was not such a sharp departure from previous admiralty precedent as some
commentators claim.273 The reasoning of Miles was recognized earlier by
the Court in Higginbotham regarding the statutory preemption of
DOHSA.274
The prohibition on double recovery between Jones Act negligence and
unseaworthiness demonstrates that a statute can control recovery of a
general maritime law claim.275 A seaman has a choice between recovering

267. Id. at 424–25 (“Limiting recovery for maintenance and cure to whatever
is permitted by the Jones Act would give greater pre-emptive effect to the Act
than is required by its text or any of this Court’s other decisions interpreting the
statute.” (citations omitted)); see also deGravelles, supra note 67, at 139–40.
268. Id. at 417 (“Further supporting this interpretation of the Jones Act, this
Court has consistently recognized that the Act ‘was remedial, for the benefit and
protection of seamen who are peculiarly the wards of admiralty. Its purpose was
to enlarge that protection, not to narrow it.’” (quoting The Arizona v. Anelich,
298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936))).
269. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32–33 (1990).
270. Id.
271. See McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (2014).
272. See McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991).
273. See Force, supra note 37, at 766 (“During the last twenty years, there has
been a major change with respect to the recovery of damages for loss of
consortium in American tort law.”); see also deGravelles, supra note 67, at 129
(“The tide turned against seamen when the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
loss of society damages in Miles.”).
274. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
275. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 n.10 (2009).
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under the Jones Act or unseaworthiness.276 The prohibition against double
recovery is significant because if courts made punitive damages available
for unseaworthiness, seamen predictably would often choose to bring an
action under unseaworthiness rather than the Jones Act. That result would
circumvent a statutory remedy in favor of a judge-made remedy and
violate the Miles uniformity principle.277 Therefore, because both the
Jones Act and unseaworthiness involve the same legal wrong and
Congress has occupied the field of seamen tort damages, unseaworthiness
punitive damages should be unavailable since those damages are not
available under the Jones Act. Nevertheless, courts are still undecided
whether to limit the Miles reasoning only to wrongful death actions
because that is all the Court directly addressed in Miles.278
C. No Distinction Should Exist Between Personal Injury and Wrongful
Death
Courts have no reason to draw a distinction between the types of
damages that can be recovered under a wrongful death action and a personal
injury claim for unseaworthiness.279 Some courts have attempted to
establish this distinction, however, arguing that punitive damages are
available to seamen in personal injury cases but not to their representatives
in wrongful death actions.280 In McBride, a significant division among the
judges in the en banc Fifth Circuit concerned whether the prohibition on
punitive damages should extend to personal injury.281 Regardless of
whether the unseaworthy condition causes personal injury or death, that
condition still involves the same legal wrong as a Jones Act negligence
claim, where the seaman is entitled to only one indemnity by way of
compensatory damages.282

276. See 2 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 26:40,
at 113–16 (5th ed. 2003).
277. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
278. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 875, 2014 WL
3353044, at *10–11 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2014).
279. See Am. Exp. Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 281 (1980) (reasoning
that “[w]ithin this single body of judge-formulated law, there is no apparent
reason to differentiate between fatal and nonfatal injuries”).
280. See Asbestos, 2014 WL 3353044, at *11 (“In sum, a general maritime
claim of unseaworthiness can support a punitive damages award when brought
directly by an injured seaman, but not when brought by a seaman’s personal
representative as part of a wrongful death or survival action. Put simply, the
remedy of punitive damages exists as it did prior to the passage of the Jones Act,
and thus does not survive a seaman’s death.”).
281. See analysis of the en banc opinion supra Part II.A.2.
282. See Pac. S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928).
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1. No Distinction Under the Jones Act
Courts should not distinguish between personal injury and wrongful
death because of the intimate connection between unseaworthiness and the
Jones Act.283 Under FELA, which Congress incorporated by reference into
the Jones Act, no distinction between wrongful death and personal injury
exists. Likewise, courts should not draw a distinction under the Jones Act.284
The Jones Act provides recovery for both personal injury and wrongful
death, such that courts should extend the prohibition on recovering punitive
damages under the Jones Act to unseaworthiness.285 The courts should not
draw distinctions in recovery where Congress has not drawn such a
distinction but instead should look to the legislature for policy guidance.286
In contrast, some argue that the FELA prohibition on punitive damages
applies only to wrongful death claims.287 No case under FELA, however,
has allowed punitive damages for either personal injury or wrongful
death.288 Although the case that originally announced the pecuniary
limitation happened to involve wrongful death, the prohibition on punitive
damages has also been acknowledged in the personal-injury context.289 In
Wildman v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., the Ninth Circuit did not
draw any distinction in its holding that punitive damages were unavailable
for personal injury under FELA.290 Because the Jones Act incorporated

283. See supra Part III.B.2.
284. See Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1457 (6th Cir.
1993) (“It has been the unanimous judgment of the courts since before the
enactment of the Jones Act that punitive damages are not recoverable under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act.” (citing Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,
449 F.2d 1238, 1240–43 (6th Cir. 1971))); Wildman v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,
825 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[P]unitive damages are unavailable under
the FELA.”).
285. See supra Part III.B.
286. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
287. See Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 (1913) (“This
cause of action is independent of any cause of action which the decedent had, and
includes no damages which he might have recovered for his injury if he had
survived.”).
288. See Miller, 989 F.2d at 1457 (“It has been the unanimous judgment of the
courts since before the enactment of the Jones Act that punitive damages are not
recoverable under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.” (citing Kozar, 449 F.2d
at 1240–43); Wildman, 825 F.2d at 1395 (“[P]unitive damages are unavailable
under the FELA.”).
289. See Wildman, 825 F.2d at 1395 (in a personal injury action, the court held
that “punitive damages are unavailable under FELA”).
290. Id.
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FELA, Jones Act punitive damages should be unavailable for both
personal injury and wrongful death.291
2. No Distinction Under the Miles Uniformity Principle
Although the reason for establishing a distinction between the
recovery for personal injury and wrongful death is based on the argument
that courts should read Miles narrowly, the uniformity principle is actually
a broad rule for how modern courts should fashion remedies in light of
congressional action.292 Some argue that the pecuniary damages limitation
applies only to wrongful death causes of action because that is all Miles
addressed.293 The reasoning of Miles, however, plainly provides that if
certain damages are not available under a statutory claim, those damages
should be likewise unavailable for a similar claim under general maritime
law.294 The purpose of this reasoning is to foster uniformity in admiralty.295
Applying the Miles uniformity principle, courts should extend the
prohibition of recovering punitive damages under the Jones Act for both
personal injury and wrongful death to unseaworthiness because both
involve a single legal wrong.296
General maritime law did not, however, originally provide an action
for wrongful death.297 Accordingly, it could be argued that Townsend
limited the application of Miles because the Court stated that “it was only
because of congressional action that a general federal cause of action for
wrongful death on the high seas and in territorial waters even existed . . . .”298
Because a personal-injury action for unseaworthiness existed before the Jones
Act, punitive damages arguably could be available for personal-injury
291. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012) (“Laws of the United States
regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply
to an action under this section.”).
292. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 875, 2014 WL 3353044,
at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2014).
293. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (“Congress has
placed limits on recovery in survival actions that we cannot exceed. Because this
case involves the death of a seaman, we must look to the Jones Act.”); McBride
v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 419 (2014) (Graves, J., dissenting)
(“[R]ead with its proper scope, the pecuniary damages limitation recognized in
Miles applies only to the wrongful death causes of action brought by McBride.”).
294. Id. at 27; see also Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 426–27
(2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
295. See supra Part I.A.
296. See supra Part III.B.
297. See generally The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886) (holding there could
be no recovery for wrongful death in admiralty), overruled by Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
298. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 420; see also McBride, 768 F.3d at 422 (Graves,
J., dissenting).
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unseaworthiness, but not wrongful death.299 This argument, however,
undermines the fundamental reasoning of Miles that remains sound even after
Townsend.300 The purpose of Miles, specifically its uniformity principle, was
to promote uniformity under maritime law.301 Creating the anomaly that a
personal injury seaman can recover punitive damages for unseaworthiness
while the representative of a deceased seaman cannot is antithetical to the
central purpose of Miles.302 Nevertheless, controversy regarding the scope
of Miles still remains, and the Supreme Court should resolve the conflict
that exists between the reasoning of Miles and Townsend.
D. The Fifth Circuit Sets the Right Course for Unseaworthiness Punitive
Damages
The issues that McBride raised have substantial policy implications.
The Fifth Circuit was the first United States Circuit Court of Appeals to
hold that unseaworthiness punitive damages are unavailable in the wake of
Townsend.303 Significant division among the federal district courts persists on
this issue, however.304 Whereas McBride clearly prohibits unseaworthiness
punitive damages in the Fifth Circuit, courts have allowed punitive recovery
in other parts of the country.305 In light of the goal of uniformity, the remedies
in American maritime law for unseaworthiness should be consistent.306
Further, the availability of unseaworthiness punitive damages will have a
major impact on the maritime shipping industry, where securing liability

299. See id. (“Unlike the situation presented in Miles, both the general
maritime cause of action (maintenance and cure) and the remedy (punitive
damages) were well established before the passage of the Jones Act.”).
300. See id. (“The reasoning of Miles remains sound.”).
301. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990).
302. See id. at 27. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court
found that it was an anomaly that a longshoreman could recover damages for
personal injury, but his representative could not if he died from the injury. 398
U.S. 375, 378 (1970). In response, the Court created a wrongful-death claim under
general maritime law based on Congressional intent and the national policy to
provide such a remedy. Id. at 397.
303. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2014)
(en banc).
304. Compare Snyder v. L & M Botruc Rental, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 728, 737
(E.D. La. 2013) (holding that unseaworthiness punitive damages are unavailable
under general maritime law), with Wagner v. Kona Blue Water Farms, LLC, 2010
A.M.C. 2469, 2483 (D. Haw. 2010) (holding that unseaworthiness punitive
damages are available under general maritime law).
305. See In re Complaint of Osage Marine Serv., Inc., No. 4:10CV1674, 2012
WL 709188, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. March 5, 2012).
306. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
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insurance coverage for punitive damages is often difficult.307 The availability
of punitive damages will also drastically alter settlement negotiations, which
is a critical part of litigating the maritime personal injury case.308 A uniform
rule regarding unseaworthiness punitive damages is sorely needed. The
Supreme Court should be motivated to provide a consistent interpretation of
its previous decisions, which would allow the maritime industry to better
predict their liability exposure.309
Although the Fifth Circuit reached the correct result, this conclusion is
not the end of the road for the debate over unseaworthiness recovery. Despite
the Supreme Court’s recent refusal to answer this question,310 the Court will
likely eventually have to settle this issue and decide a uniform interpretation
of the interplay between Miles, Townsend, unseaworthiness, and the Jones
Act. Considering the policy concerns and the national importance of this issue,
the Supreme Court must heed the sound reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in McBride.311
CONCLUSION
In today’s maritime industry, the seas are much calmer. Although
seamen were historically tossed into rough waters, the mere availability of
punitive damages in these ancient times does not justify conjuring up the
past to judicially expand claims. Even though current law entitles seamen to
recover punitive damages for their employer’s failure to pay maintenance
and cure, this reasoning does not extend to unseaworthiness and the Jones
Act.312 Both unseaworthiness and the Jones Act involve the same legal
wrong whereby a seaman is entitled to recover one indemnity—
compensatory damages.313 Additionally, courts have no reason to draw a
recovery distinction between personal injury and wrongful death, as this
distinction would create an unjust anomaly in maritime law.314 Therefore,
307. 46 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM § 1605, at 503 (Joseph J. Bassano & Kathy
Macomber eds., 2007) (recognizing that the split of authority whether public
policy prohibits the issuance of a liability insurance covering punitive damages).
308. Rod Sullivan, Enforcing a Seaman’s Right to Medical Care After Atlantic
Sounding v. Townsend, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 32 (2009) (“A defendant in a civil
suit that has liability insurance is therefore motivated, in a case where punitive
damages are alleged, to pressure its insurance carrier to settle the liability portion
of a lawsuit in order to avoid the prospect of having a judgment entered for
uninsured punitive damages.”).
309. See supra Part II.B.
310. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
311. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 401 (5th Cir.
2014) (en banc) (Clement, J., concurring).
312. See supra Part III.A.
313. See supra Part III.B.
314. See supra Part III.C.
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the Supreme Court, using the persuasive reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in
McBride, should conclude that unseaworthiness punitive damages are
unavailable under general maritime law.
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